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Abstract
Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to
quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations
of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a` la
Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why
the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak
theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.
† Published in Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, J. Cushing,
A. Fine and S. Goldstein (eds), Kluwer Academic Press (Dordrecht, 1996). The article
refers to discussions at the 1995 Bielefeld meeting, “Quantum Theory Without Observers”.
A distressing feature of discussions of the problems of quantum theory is their tendency
to transform physicists from thoughtful and sophisticated scientific critics into uncompli-
cated partisans or unsympathetic spectators. This holds true although the most interesting
questions posed by the various formulations of quantum theory, and by rival theories, are
precisely the type of scientific and technical problems which physicists are trained to ad-
dress. What, for example, does any given theory or formulation allow us to predict or
infer, and from what data? Which of these predictions and inferences can be tested? How
precise is the mathematical formulation, and what mathematical properties does it have?
To what extent is it consistent with important physical principles such as invariance under
Lorentz or general coordinate transformations? How elegantly is the theory formulated?
On how many arbitrary quantities does it depend?
It would be good to reach consensus. Our present lack of success seems to stem
less from subtle difficulties or metaphysical differences than from the fact that scientific
assessments of interpretations of quantum theory or its rivals are unfashionable. I do not
want to overstate the importance of scientific appraisal. Of course, creative theoretical
work is the life blood of physics; physicists need not, and perhaps generally should not,
also be philosophers of science. But it is, surely, good to have a clear understanding of
what current approaches to quantum theory can, or could possibly, achieve. And, in fact, I
would suggest that it is now relatively easy to see that every approach to quantum theory
leads to serious problems and that there remain relatively few research programs with
any serious ambition of solving our difficulties. This, certainly, was the majority view at
Bielefeld, though agreement on precisely which are the serious programs and problems was
harder to come by. A minority view, forcefully put at the meeting, was that the problems
of quantum theory have been solved by the consistent histories formalism — or at least
that the form of a solution has been convincingly sketched. My impression at the end of
the meeting was that, although most of the participants believed this to be false, those
unpersuaded by consistent histories had reached no agreement on precisely what constitute
the problems — still less the virtues — of the consistent histories program.
1
This article aims, no doubt optimistically, to explain both the problems and the
virtues, to persuade consistent historians that their formalism is scientifically problematic,
and to persuade sceptics that it is nonetheless scientifically interesting. I will try to show
that the consistent histories formulation, sensibly interpreted, significantly changes our
understanding of the scientific status of quantum theory, not only because it offers a new
formulation but also because it sheds new light on earlier interpretations. In particular, I
will compare and contrast the consistent histories approach, the Copenhagen interpretation
a` la Landau-Lifshitz, and Bohmian mechanics. In so doing I will argue that some important
technical claims made in the consistent histories literature turn out to be simply false.
When sensibly interpreted, the formalism’s chief virtue turns out to be not, as advertised,
that it solves the problems of quantum theory, but rather that it highlights particular
scientific problems. Nonetheless, I will conclude, it can be used to give an interpretation of
quantum theory which in important ways is better crafted, or at least more honest about
its deficiencies, than any of the standard interpretations.
This discussion of consistent histories is drawn from recent joint work with Fay
Dowker.[1,2] Our conclusions are set out at length in Ref. [1]. Rather than repeating
the details of the arguments here, I will try to state the main results succinctly, to add
some explanatory comments, and to respond to some points raised during the Bielefeld
meeting.
Our thesis is the following. We agree with other critics of consistent histories that
the present interpretations of the formalism have some extremely unattractive features:
indeed, we show that in the cases of Omne`s and Gell Mann and Hartle they have more
serious problems. However, we distinguish between criticism of the interpretations offered
in the literature and criticisms of the consistent histories approach per se. To take one
example, Griffiths’ proposal to interpret the formalism as defining a non-classical logic is,
of course, open to the usual criticisms of quantum logic. This seemed to cause confusion
at Bielefeld: some took Griffiths’ logic to be an essential part of the consistent histories
program. Yet nothing in the consistent histories formalism requires it. On the contrary,
the formalism defines a sensible interpretation of quantum theory, using ordinary logic and
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language, which we call the Unknown Set interpretation. It is instructive to examine this
interpretation, to see why it cannot be improved upon without going beyond the consistent
histories formalism, and to understand its weakness as a scientific theory — for one is then
forced to appreciate both that the consistent histories formalism has virtues which other
approaches to quantum theory lack, and that it has defects which other formulations
remedy.
Let me now try to explain the reasons for our conclusions, assuming familiarity with
the basic notions of consistent histories. For definiteness, consider the non-relativistic
formulation in which sets of consistent histories are defined by sequences of projective de-
compositions {σ1, . . . , σn} at times t1, . . . , tn, each σi comprising projections P
1
i , . . . , P
ni
i ,
together with the Gell Mann–Hartle consistency conditions
Tr(P ann . . . P
a1
1
ρiP
b1
1
. . . P bnn ) = δa1b1 . . . δanbnp(a1, . . . , an) , (1)
this last expression defining the probability of the history. Here ρi is the density matrix
defining initial conditions for the system, which I take to be the universe. There are
other interesting formulations and consistency conditions in the literature. Moreover, the
formalism admits a time-symmetric generalisation of quantum mechanics in which a second
density matrix ρf defines final conditions. However, so far as we can tell, the basic scientific
problems of the formalism are unsolved by any of these variations.
When the possible sequences of projective decompositions are suitably parametrised,
the Gell Mann–Hartle consistency conditions reduce to simple algebraic equations in the
parameters. In other words, once the boundary conditions are fixed, the classification of
consistent sets is a purely algebraic problem. It is hard to solve the relevant equations in
any but the simplest of examples, or to prove general results about their solutions. Assume
for the moment, though, that the equations have no very special properties. One would
then expect that almost all the solutions can be parametrised by a number of parameters
equal to the number of unknowns minus the number of consistency equations. If the
number of parameters is much larger than the number of equations, one would also expect
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that, given an approximate solution, one can generically find an exact solution very close
by.
I mention these mathematical trivialities because, if they apply to consistent his-
torical descriptions of real world physical events or experiments, they have interesting
consequences for our understanding of the theory.1 Suppose, for example, we set up a
series of N independent experiments in which (to use the standard Copenhagen language)
distinct macroscopic devices measure observables of a microscopic quantum system and
display the results by pointers, the experiments being complete and their results displayed
at times t1, . . . , tN separated by macroscopic intervals. Consistent historians can, of course,
reproduce the standard probabilistic predictions for the results of these experiments, and
do so roughly thus. First, we identify the initial density matrix. Next, we fix orthogo-
nal projection operators at times t1, . . . , tN , corresponding to the possible positions of the
relevant pointers and their complement. Then we argue that the decoherence effect of
the environment (photons interacting with the pointers, and so on) will ensure that the
set defined by these projections satisfies the consistency conditions to an extremely good
approximation — the off-diagonal terms, let us say, are no larger than 10−40. Finally,
we take this degree of inconsistency as completely negligible, and simply use the standard
decoherence functional expressions for the probabilities of the various results. The justi-
fication for this procedure, given by Gell Mann and Hartle, is that we need not require a
fundamental theory to give precisely defined probabilities, or to give probabilities which
precisely obey the standard sum rules, since the purpose of theory is to calculate testable
quantities and errors of 10−40 in our probability calculations are inconsequential in any
conceivable experimental test.
1 Unfortunately, though it would be surprising if this discussion did not apply to real world
physics, there seems to be no way to test the question directly. It would, though, be interesting
to test whether the consistency equations do indeed have the expected algebraic properties in
moderately sized Hilbert spaces and our conclusions hold in toy models.
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If our expectations about the consistency equations are justified, we can improve on
this discussion. The number of parameters needed to parametrise possible projection op-
erators is hugely — perhaps infinitely — greater than the number of consistency equations
here, and this has two important consequences.
The first is that the approximately consistent set used in these calculations could,
in principle, be replaced by a very similar exactly consistent set which would produce
essentially the same probabilities — indeed, we expect a parametrised family of exactly
consistent sets passing close to the set we initially used. We do not expect the sets in
this family generally to involve projections we would naturally consider: their projections
will generally be onto complicated subspaces of the Hilbert space describing the apparatus
and its environment. Nor do we expect any single set in the family to be picked out in
any natural way. Nonetheless, the consistent histories formalism tells us that the family
contains valid sets of histories with well-defined probabilities. Thus there is no need in
principle ever to introduce approximately consistent sets: we can assume, without any
serious fear of experimental contradiction, that exactly consistent sets are the only ones
of fundamental physical relevance. Of course, this makes no practical difference, since we
do not know precisely which exactly consistent set is relevant to any given experimental
or cosmological calculation, and in practice — unless and until some rule is found which
identifies the relevant consistent set for us — we would generally use the usual approxi-
mately consistent set and accept that we thereby introduce small errors. Nonetheless, on
this view, the formalism defines a mathematically precise theory, and this — if elegance
and lack of ad hockery are thought to be of any intrinsic merit — must surely be counted
a gain.
The second and perhaps more significant consequence is that the consistent histories
formalism shows that the standard Copenhagen description is chosen from a far larger
class of possibilities than we previously appreciated. For we expect the parametrised
family of consistent sets to be characterised by a very large number of parameters, and to
be dominated by exactly consistent sets very far away from the approximately consistent
set we chose initially. Now it has certainly always been understood that there are slight
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ambiguities in any Copenhagen description of a series of experiments, since there is a
certain freedom in the choice of the Heisenberg cuts between system and observer. What
is new here is the discovery that there is a continuous family of equally valid physical
descriptions of the experiments and that, while this family includes standard Copenhagen
descriptions, almost all of its members involve variables quite different from, and not
even approximately deterministically related to, the classical degrees of freedom used in
the standard discussions. In the Copenhagen approach, any assignment of probabilities to
physical events not describable by classical degrees of freedom is forbidden. If we accept the
consistent histories formalism as a correct generalisation of the Copenhagen interpretation,
we have to accept that such an assignment is theoretically sensible, and we then have to
understand why the Copenhagen interpretation is nonetheless all that we need for practical
purposes.
This, in fact, is the key question. The formalism offers a myriad of possible vari-
ables for describing physics. Can it, suitably interpreted, explain why the world reliably
continues to appear to us always to be described by the particular measure zero subset
corresponding to familiar quasi-classical variables? Dowker and I argue that it cannot.
In fact, we make the following stronger claim. The scientific content of the consistent
histories formalism is given by the so-called Unknown Set Interpretation, which postulates
that the fundamental probabilistic theory of nature is defined by a choice of initial den-
sity matrix, hamiltonian and canonical variables — all of which we might hope to specify
precisely by some elegant theory — together with some unknown and theoretically un-
specifiable consistent set of histories. The histories from that set define the sample space
of possible events, and the decoherence functional then defines the probability measure on
that sample space in the usual way. Thus, one history from the Unknown Set is chosen
randomly to be realised, and it is this history which describes all of physics.2 No other
2 It is often suggested that a fundamental theory which assigns probabilities to a single event
in this way is problematic, or even meaningless. This is usually intended to be a criticism only
of a particular type of theory, but seems in fact to imply a rejection of all probabilistic physical
theories. For, practically speaking, a theory phrased in this way is no more or less testable than
any other probabilistic theory, since we can only perform finitely many experiments.
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history, from this or any other set, is realised, and no set other than the single Unknown
Set is of any relevance for calculating the probabilities of physical events.
Let me emphasise at once that we are not suggesting that this interpretation is ul-
timately satisfactory. We put it forward to strip away what we see as inessential and
sometimes confusing proposals in the literature. Our claim is that, insofar as the consis-
tent histories literature supplies sensible interpretations of the formalism, those interpreta-
tions are almost precisely scientifically equivalent to the Unknown Set Interpretation — in
other words, they make almost precisely the same predictions, retrodictions and inferences.
Where the literature claims to go beyond these predictions, retrodictions and inferences,
it is either erroneous or else relies on significant assumptions extraneous to the consistent
histories formalism.
Before making the case that the Unknown Set interpretation really does encapsulate
the scientific content of the formalism, let me discuss its scientific implications. An inter-
esting question, raised at Bielefeld by Michael Dickson, is whether so apparently weak an
interpretation really deserves the title of a scientific theory. To give a fully satisfactory
answer would require a general set of criteria for scientific theories. I do not have such a
set of criteria. However, it seems to me that, once the initial density matrix, hamiltonian,
and canonical variables are specified, the interpretation ought comfortably to pass any
reasonable test. It is well-defined, and moreover comes from a quite elegant and natural
mathematical formalism; it is certainly falsifiable; one even, at present, has to admit (as a
matter of logic rather than of plausibility) the possibility that it is the best purely mathe-
matical theory of nature which can be constructed. The interpretation makes one definite
prediction, which is that all the events we have observed to date, or will observe in the
future, can be described by a history of non-zero probability from some consistent set. If
this fails to hold, as in principle it could, then the interpretation — and, of course, the
entire consistent histories formalism — must be rejected. The interpretation makes further
predictions. These predictions are generally probabilistic, in the same way as the Copen-
hagen interpretation is. What is new and peculiar to the consistent histories formalism is
that they are also conditional on an unknown physical quantity: the relevant consistent
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set. Given a particular observed history, we can predict that if a certain event is described
by one branch of a consistent extension of that history, and if that particular consistent
extension turns out to be part of the Unknown Set, then the relevant event will occur with
the conditional probability defined in the usual way by the decoherence functional. If —
when, say, we attempt to predict the outcome of a series of experiments — we find that we
do observe definite results (i.e., in this interpretation, that the corresponding projections
do belong to the Unknown Set) but that the calculated conditional probabilities predict
outcomes significantly different from those observed then, again, we must reject either the
theory being interpreted — i.e. the specification of boundary conditions, hamiltonian,
and canonical variables — or the interpretation itself. Likewise, even before we perform
experiments, we are likely to reject some aspect of the theory if the observed history to
date is highly improbable. Like most probabilistic tests, these last two of course require
some intuitive or theoretical method of coarse-graining events. That is, we reject the the-
ory not because a small probability event occurs (all possible alternatives may have small
probability) but because we believe we can identify a natural division of the alternatives
into two classes and we find that sum of the probabilities of the events in the class to which
the occurring event belongs is small.
The problem with the Unknown Set interpretation — and, of course, the reason for
doubt as to whether it constitutes a theory — is that it gives no algorithm for making
probabilistic predictions which depend only on the observed data. Every prediction takes
the following form: “if the Unknown Set contains the following projective decomposition
at the following future time, then the probability for the future event described by one of
the projections is p”. The interpretation does not predict that any future events will occur,
or that those which do occur will be describable in terms of familiar variables. In particular,
it does not predict that those variables which Gell-Mann and Hartle call quasi-classical —
variables which describe macroscopic aggregates and which generally follow deterministic
equations of motion to a very good approximation — will continue to be relevant. Quite the
contrary: according to this interpretation, the apparent persistence of quasiclassicality is
a great and inexplicable mystery. Thus, granted that the interpretation defines a scientific
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theory, it is a theory with a glaring weakness. For most physicists, surely, believe that
they will continue to experience a quasiclassical world for the foreseeable future: few are
startled each morning by the dawning of yet another quasiclassical day. The persistence of
quasiclassical experience, in other words, is part of our theory of nature. Some well-known
presentations of quantum theory assume it explicitly.[3] Many do not, apparently because
it has not been understood that there are well-defined interpretations of quantum theory in
which quasiclassicality would not be perceived to persist, and that we need some scientific
reason for rejecting such interpretations. A virtue of the consistent histories formalism, in
the Unknown Set interpretation, is that it makes these points absolutely clear.
Let us now turn to the interpretations in the consistent histories literature. It is only
possible to outline the arguments here, but perhaps a brief precis will be of use. I hope
the reader, and those criticised, will forgive the necessarily crude summaries.
Griffiths[4] suggests that the consistent histories formalism should be interpreted as
defining a new logic adapted to propositions describing the physical world. Griffiths’ logic
has the property that any two propositions referring to projections belonging to different
consistent sets can be true without implying that their conjunction is true. We can, for
instance, predict that the detectors at CERN will function tomorrow in the ordinary way,
producing quasiclassical records of the events they detect, and also predict that the detec-
tors, and their recording devices, and much else besides, will not behave quasiclassically
tomorrow. We cannot, however, use Griffiths’ logical rules to deduce the prediction that
the detectors both will and will not behave quasiclassically. We hence avoid contradiction
though — as is usual with quantum logic — at the price of a theory which we simply do
not understand how to interpret. Griffiths’ interpretation, however, skirts the key point.
We can never experience the truth or falsity of propositions from more than one consistent
set. If the formalism is fundamentally correct then all our scientific endeavours will be
described by one consistent set and the scientifically relevant problem is the identification
of that set. We can, of course, do calculations in other sets; we can too, if we wish, manip-
ulate propositions involving other sets according to Griffiths’ logical rules — but neither of
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these activities are of any use in predicting the future we will actually experience. Griffiths’
interpretation is scientifically equivalent to the Unknown Set interpretation.
Omne`s also interprets the formalism as defining rules for the logical analysis of proposi-
tions about the physical world.[5,6,7] Omne`s’ logics are conventional: propositions belong-
ing to incompatible consistent sets simply cannot be discussed together. The significant
new proposal in Omne`s’ interpretation is the notion of a “true proposition” — a proposi-
tion which is not given to us in the form of observed data, but is deducible from those data
by a new rule appended to the consistent histories formalism. Unfortunately,[1] as Omne`s
accepts, the rule he originally proposed fails to allow the intended deductions: indeed, it
generally seems to allow almost no deductions.3
Perhaps it is a slight overstatement to say that we are left with an interpretation
scientifically equivalent to the Unknown Set interpretation: this depends on exactly how
narrowly one defines science when its subject matter is the past. Any principle which allows
even a few inferences about the past, untestable though they may be, would probably
generally be regarded as scientifically useful if those inferences form part of an elegant and
compelling theoretical explanation of present data. There seems to be no evidence that
any inferences implied by Omne`s’ original criterion do so, but the possibility cannot be
completely excluded. However, so far as the criteria for truth in the existing literature are
concerned and insofar as they apply to predictions, we must indeed conclude that they
indeed do not affect the scientific status of the formalism.
Gell Mann and Hartle’s conclusions,[8,9,10] however, certainly go beyond those implied
by the Unknown Set interpretation. In fact, Dowker and I argue[1] that those conclusions
are not entirely coherent in their use of the formalism. Nonetheless, the central claim of Gell
Mann and Hartle’s interpretation is tenable. This is the suggestion that quasiclassicality
appears to us to persist not because quasiclassical variables play any special role in the
3 Could another definition of “truth” do the job? Omne`s has new proposals. Dowker and I too
have investigated possible alternative rules. Our tentative conclusion is that interesting rules do
exist which allow at least some non-trivial inferences about the past, but we can identify no rule
which allows any useful predictions of the future. We hope to give a detailed discussion elsewhere.
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theory, but because we ourselves have evolved organs of perception which are sensitive to
those variables and a mental apparatus which represents the world in quasiclassical terms.
But is this a valid argument without further assumption, or is it, like other recent ideas
relating consciousness to quantum theory, a speculation?
At first sight it appears not only a valid argument but close to a truism. Almost all
scientists would agree that our perceptions and our mental algorithms have evolved to be-
come highly sophisticated at gathering and utilising quasiclassical data. This agreement,
though, is predicated on the assumption that one may assume a quasiclassical description
of the world. Quasiclassical variables arise naturally in higher order theories of nature
such as classical mechanics, chemistry, and terrestrial biology, and evolutionary biologists
take their use for granted. Likewise, our theories of brain function are classical theories
and our understanding of consciousness, such as it is, is entirely based on classical mod-
els. We cannot use biological science to justify any general conclusions about evolution,
perception, or consciousness from within a novel interpretation of quantum theory such
as the consistent histories interpretation. For if we take seriously a theory — such as the
consistent histories formalism — which describes us as being in superpositions of quasi-
classical states, or in states defined in terms of entirely non-quasiclassical variables, we
can make no statement about our perceptions in those states without new hypotheses.
Such hypotheses would necessarily be speculative: they certainly do not follow from our
conventional, quasiclassical understanding of the relation of perception to brain function;
nor do they follow from any empirical data or theoretical insight presently available to us.
What one would need, in fact, is a theory of consciousness written directly in the language
of the formalism. It is hard to imagine, and Gell-Mann and Hartle do not try to explain,
how one would presently go about trying to formulate such a theory.
We conclude, then, modulo a minor caveat about Omne`s’ treatment of the past, that
the Unknown Set interpretation is indeed scientifically equivalent to the interpretations
discussed in the literature, when they are stripped of extraneous hypotheses. Although
there is currently no single canonical formulation of quantum theory, it can reasonably be
argued that the consistent histories formulation is the minimal formulation of the quantum
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theory of a closed system which produces a well-defined scientific theory. It tells us that,
even when we ignore general relativity, our theory of the macroscopic world — and in
particular our expectation of its persisting quasiclassicality — involves assumptions that
go beyond both quantum theory and any theory of the cosmological boundary conditions.
Some thoughtful critics and advocates of orthodox quantum theory have long appreciated
this. Perhaps it has remained controversial only through the wider confusion over inter-
pretations of quantum theory. The consistent histories formalism now so clearly defines a
natural interpretation of quantum theory, and spells the conclusion out so precisely, that
it is hard to see how any serious controversy can persist.
As we have seen, the formalism also shows that there are equally valid, perfectly well-
defined, alternatives in which quasiclassicality persists only for an interval, or never arises.
This is an important new development in our understanding of quantum theory.4
Bohmians and collapse model theorists may happily accept that the formalism sup-
plies new arguments against orthodox quantum theory, but will perhaps feel our analysis
confirms their belief that the formalism has no positive scientific use. Is the formalism
not, after all, scientifically sterile? Were the problems it illustrates not solved long ago
by Bohmian mechanics? Are dynamical collapse models, with their intriguing alternative
explanation of quasiclassicality, not a far more vital subject of research? I sympathise
with the spirit of these questions, but let me end by explaining why I cannot dismiss the
formalism so conclusively.
First, while defining the problems of quantum theory very clearly, it also suggests an
interesting possible form of a solution. All one needs is a rule (perhaps probabilistic) which
4 Its novelty might be disputed. It is true that something similar occurs in interpretations
of quantum mechanics in which the events at different times are entirely uncorrelated. For such
interpretations arbitrary basis selection rules can be used at each point in time, and in partic-
ular one can use rules in which the system lies in an eigenstate of quasiclassical operators for a
while and an eigenstate of non-quasiclassical operators thereafter. But few take such ahistorical
interpretations seriously. One can probably find historical interpretations, other than the consis-
tent histories formalism, in which quasiclassicality does not persist — for example, it ought to
be possible to produce generalised Bohmian theories with this property — but I can think of no
discussion of such interpretations in the literature.
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takes as input the dynamics and boundary conditions of a theory and produces as output
a consistent set (the Unknown Set) which turns out to be quasiclassical. This, of course,
begs the question of whether such a rule can be found. Here the superiority of Bohmian
mechanics and of GRW-type collapse models is presently clear, since the analogous selection
principle is already known in both cases and both theories explain quasiclassicality. It
remains to be seen whether they give the right explanation and whether they are capable
of giving any explanation in the context of relativistic quantum field theory: the same, of
course, is true of the consistent histories formalism.
Second, the consistent histories formalism seems to be a strong competitor theory
where cosmological applications are concerned. For example, one can easily imagine theo-
ries of structure formation involving a series of past events which can be described within a
consistent set but which, even if a good Bohmian cosmological theory were to exist, could
not naturally be described in terms of Bohmian trajectories.
Third, the consistent histories formalism surely ought to be explored further precisely
because it is a good formulation of quantum theory. If the eventual goal is to go beyond
quantum theory, it is probably as well to understand all interesting formulations and
interpretations of the theory. Different formulations, after all, may inspire different post-
quantum theories. We need, in particular, to understand the possible definitions of “truth”
and their properties; a general treatment of quantum field theory in the consistent histories
formulation; and a clearer understanding of how the formalism applies to cosmology.
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